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Abstract 
The growth of mining activities in Africa in the last decade has coincided with increased 
attention on the fate of the continent’s forests, specifically in the contexts of livelihoods and 
climate change. Although mining has serious environmental impacts, scant attention has been 
paid to the processes which shape decision-making in contexts where minerals and forests 
overlap. Focussing on the illustrative case of Ghana, this paper articulates the dynamics of 
power, authority and legitimacy of private companies, traditional authorities and key state 
institutions in governing mining activities in forests. The analysis highlights how mining 
companies and donors promote a neoliberal model of resource management which entrenches 
their ability to benefit from mineral exploitation and marginalises the role of state institutions 
and traditional authorities in decision-making. This subsequently erodes state authority and 
legitimacy and compounds the contested nature of traditional authorities’ legitimacy. A more 
nuanced examination of foundational governance questions concerning the relative role of the 
state, traditional authorities and private interests is needed.   
 
1. Introduction 
The mineralisation of sub-Saharan African economies, combined with growing concern 
regarding the consequences of diminishing forest cover on climate and poor forest-dependent 
communities, is increasingly drawing attention to the interactions between mining and 
forestry (Cotula, 2012; Edwards et al., 2013). Well-articulated concerns about the efficiency, 
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equity and sustainability of mineral exploitation in sub-Saharan Africa are amplified in 
forest-rich contexts because intact forests provide a multitude of (often under-valued) 
ecosystem services across a range of scales. Forests also play a critical role in the livelihoods 
of poor people who often do not benefit from mining activities, but bear the associated social 
and environmental costs of extraction (Akabzaa, 2000; Dondeyne et al., 2009; Ferguson, 
2006; Whitmore, 2006).  
Navigation of the environmental and social conflicts and trade-offs1 associated with mining 
in forested landscapes is largely contingent on the governance arrangements which shape 
decisions over natural resources. However, assessments of the multifarious trends and drivers 
of natural resource governance in sub-Saharan Africa are criticised for unfolding within 
sectoral2 ‘silos’, long recognised as a barrier to the formulation of holistic and more nuanced 
analyses of how resources are governed within their broader landscape (Sayer and Campbell, 
2005; Young et al., 2014). As Mwitwa et al. (2012:20) point out, ‘a great deal is now known 
about forest governance in landscapes shaped by internal dynamics within the sector... much 
less is known, however, about forest governance in the context of extra-sectoral investments’. 
Sectoral analyses frequently fail to explicitly address the conflicts and trade-offs which 
underlie much of the scepticism regarding the simultaneous achievement of the 
environmental and developmental goals of sustainable development. This is epitomized in 
debates regarding emerging ‘win-win’ strategies to environmental governance, such as 
schemes to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) (Gupta, 2012). The 
inclusion of concerns regarding livelihoods within REDD+3 and the broader shift towards 
examining ‘landscapes’ (Sayer et al., 2013) underscores the need for further consideration of 
forest exploitation and conservation within their wider resource-use contexts.  
There is, however, a dearth of detailed empirical analyses which investigate the complex 
multi-scale interactions that characterise cross-sectoral governance, as well as how these 
dynamics are shaped by the power, authority and legitimacy of key stakeholder groups (see 
Mwitwa et al., 2012 and Hirons, 2013 as notable exceptions). Building on analysis presented 
in Hirons (2013) of mining in Ghana’s high forest zone, this paper aims to fill this gap by 
                                                          
1 Trade-offs refer to the balancing of competing objectives from one particular perspective and conflicts 
refer to situations of competition or disagreement between two or more individuals, groups or sectors 
(after Grimble and Wellard, 1997).   
2 Sectors are defined loosely here as a ‘conceptual area’ of economically productive activity 
(Dominguez and Plana, 2002) 
3 REDD+ also includes concerns for biodiversity and carbon stock enhancement.  
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broadening understanding of key issues associated with resource governance in contexts 
where minerals and forests overlap spatially.  
The following section outlines a power-centric approach to examining cross-sectoral natural 
resource governance.  Section 3 outlines the broad characteristics of mining-forest 
governance in Ghana. This provides the foundation for exploring the authority and legitimacy 
of mining companies and miners, traditional authorities and the state. The paper concludes by 
highlighting the need for politicised understandings of natural resource governance.  It 
furthermore calls for attention to be paid to processes capable of fostering deliberation of the 
relationship between the state and traditional authorities which are fundamental to shaping 
the governance of mining in forested areas.  
 
2. Cross-sectoral natural resource governance: Adopting a plurality of perspectives on 
power 
The overlapping spatial distribution of forest and mineral resources across sub-Saharan 
Africa gives rise to a series of conflicts and trade-offs, particularly in the context of 
widespread pursuit of sustainable development which ostensibly aims to balance economic, 
social and environmental objectives. Understanding the governance of natural resources – 
essentially, who makes decisions about resources and how (after Cotula and Mayers, 2009) – 
is a key to diagnosing mining-forest conflicts and developing equitable and efficient resource 
management strategies. Analyses of formal rules and regulations governing natural resource 
use is only partially illuminating:  as Wardell and Lund (2006:1888) explain, ‘Underneath the 
changing waves of policy and the restrictive powers of government agencies, another pattern 
of actual governance unfolds’. This ‘actual governance’ is shaped by the dynamics of power, 
authority and legitimacy among stakeholder groups and key actors. This paper focuses on the 
power dynamics of a sub-set of these actors, namely the primary government bodies 
responsible for overseeing mining and forest activities, mining companies and traditional 
authorities.  
 
There are numerous conceptual approaches to power, legitimacy and authority. Although 
adopting a plurality of perspectives on power presents a risk of conceptual incoherence, the 
advantage of a broad understanding is that subsequent analyses shed light on power dynamics 
in multiple dimensions yielding more comprehensive understandings. Here, Weberian 
4 
 
notions of power as the probability one actor will be able to carry out their will within a 
relationship are combined with more poststructural conceptions of the operation power, such 
as through discourse (Foucault, 1994; Humphreys, 2009). Authority is often viewed as 
‘legitimate power’, and while there are definitional debates, it is generally assumed that 
perceptions of legitimacy affect the likelihood that someone will obey an authority. 
Legitimacy, therefore, is a central component of understanding resource governance (Colfer, 
2011). Power is contingent on the ability of stakeholders to marshal economic, symbolic, 
cultural and social capital (after Hellström, 2001).  They legitimise their claims over access 
to, and ownership of, natural resources.  This process, as Sikor and Lund (2009) explain, 
revolves around the historical and cultural legitimising practices of different stakeholders 
which in turn are bound up with precedent, territoriality4 and violence. 
 
Adopting a broad view of power draws attention to the importance of structure and agency in 
governance debates. This sociological schism refers to questions regarding the importance of 
agency, the process of individual and corporate actors playing an independent causal role in 
history and making their own free choices (McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008; Brown and 
Westaway, 2011) relative to structures, the ‘sets of mutually sustaining schemas (patterns of 
thoughts and behaviours) and resources that empower and constrain social action and that 
tend to be reproduced by that social action’ (Sewell, 1992:19). Giddens (1984) argues that 
neither agents nor structures are omnipotent, and that there exists a ‘duality of structure’.   
But as the analysis that follows demonstrates, understanding the interplay between structure 
and agency helps to shed light on the multifaceted nature of power dynamics which influence 
the actual decisions which individuals and communities make and their perceived capacity to 
influence resource use patterns. The analysis draws on research conducted in the country 
capital of Accra and three localities: 1) Kibi in the Eastern Region; 2) Obuasi in the Ashanti 
Region; and 3) Bibiani in the Western Region. In total, 87 semi-structured interviews with 
purposively sampled key stakeholders, including mining company officials (n=5), small-scale 
miners (n=36), farmers and chainsaw operators (n=10), national and local government 
officials (n=24), traditional authorities (n=5) and representatives from non-governmental 
organisations (n=7), were conducted between April 2011 and July 2012. The analysis draws 
on these qualitative data, as well as field observations, field notes and documentary analysis. 
                                                          
4 The classification and ordering of spatial entities and social groups, often through registration or 
formalisation.   
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The next section of the paper examines the case of prospective bauxite mining and small-
scale mining in forest reserves to demonstrate the interplay of structure and agency across 
scales and sectors.  This provides the context for examining the power of three primary 
stakeholder groups in Section 4. 
 
3. Governing the mining-forest nexus in Ghana: Scale, structure and agency 
In Ghana, reports that environmental degradation is costing the country an equivalent of 1 per 
cent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth (World Bank, 2006) have helped to 
articulate concern regarding, inter alia, the impact of large- and small-scale mining on the 
country’s increasingly threatened forests (Hilson and Nyame, 2006; Hirons et al., 2014). 
These costs are weighed against the significant economic benefits accruing from mining.  
Formal mining generates approximately 40 per cent of gross foreign exchange in Ghana and 
accounts for ~6 per cent of its GDP (Republic of Ghana, 2005). Furthermore, the artisanal 
and small-scale mining5 (ASM) sector, which accounts for approximately 20 per cent of total 
gold production, provides a valuable livelihood for more than 1 million individuals, the 
majority of whom are unlicensed. A fundamental distinction exists in Ghana between land 
and minerals: the former is vested in stools or skins6 and the latter, ‘in their natural state’, are 
vested in the president on behalf of, and in trust for, the people (Chapter 21, 257(6) of the 
Constitution). As a result, both traditional authorities and state institutions are of central 
importance to the governance of natural resources. Three primary government agencies 
managing the intersection between mining and forestry in Ghana are the Minerals 
Commission, the Forestry Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
(Hirons, 2013). The following analysis traces how these institutions interact at different 
scales, which lays the foundation for exploring how structure-agency issues influence how 
these agencies engage with other stakeholders. It is argued that structurally shaped debates 
regarding trade-offs at a national level are transformed to conflicts at local level, where 
individual agency shapes outcomes more strongly.  
                                                          
5 There is no definitional agreement on the scales of mining, but in general ASM refers to low-tech, 
labour intensive extraction of mineral resources 
6 Both stool and skin refer to the ‘chiefly office’ (Berry, 2004), chiefs in Northern Ghana sit on symbolic 
hides which are equivalent to stools in the South. The 1992 constitution extended chiefly authority over 
land in the North, where previously it has been held by the state (Berry, 2004; Ubink and Quan, 2008).  
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At the national level, where mining-forestry debates are focussed on formal large-scale 
mining in forest reserves, effective collaboration between agencies is facilitated through the 
mining in forest reserves liaison group.7 But coordination at a local level over informal and 
off-reserve mining issues is considerably weaker. Within forest reserves, the Forestry 
Commission is responsible for managing ASM activities which, without exception, are 
operating illegally. Outside forest reserves, it is theoretically the EPA which is responsible 
for addressing mining, but the prevailing view among policy makers is that doing so is 
beyond the scope and capacity of the EPA and that the Minerals Commission is de facto 
responsible for managing all mining activities, legal or otherwise. As a result, many mining-
forest conflicts fall between already stretched government agencies.  
Furthermore, the lack of collaboration and co-ordination between agencies at the local level 
creates a discursive and governance gap which ASM falls through. As one district level 
government official from the Minerals Commission put it in an interview:  ‘As fieldmen, 
meetings between the Minerals Commission, Forestry Commission and EPA are haphazard 
and not institutionalised, so we only meet when we invite each other to workshops and 
things, but our big men interact’.  Outlining temporal components of resource conflicts 
illustrates further the complexity involved in governing the mining-forestry nexus in Ghana. 
Of particular importance is the longevity of certain conflicts. In both the mining and forestry 
sectors, markets of concessions are historically linked with the colonial enterprise (Silver, 
1981; Grove, 1997). The arrival of European mining companies precipitated a chaotic and 
disorderly market in concessions. The adverse effects of this period of contestation over land 
and resources still resonate in contemporary debates on resource management. The 
concession covering the resource conflict-riddled town of Obuasi, for example, was first 
instituted in 1897 (Ayensu, 1997). Discontent surrounding the Obuasi concession heightened 
local concerns regarding the impact of mining on the forests. One District Assembly member 
from a village near Obuasi reflected critically on this during an interview: 
We lost some of our youth in 1994 when they confronted security guards. That was 
when the conflict was at its peak. Things have got better since then. The company 
have given us electricity for free, but we don’t see it that way. We are paying a cost 
                                                          
7 The cross-sectoral liaison group instituted under the 2001, ‘Environmental guidelines for mining in 
production forest reserves in Ghana’ facilitates coordination between different government agencies 
interested in mining in forest reserves, including the Water Resources Commission, Ghana EPA, Forest 
Services Division, Ghana Chamber of Mines and inspectorate division of the Minerals Commission. 
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for the social and environmental damage caused by the mining. Forests and 
ecosystems have been destroyed... we used to have fish for free, now we have 
electricity for free. 
It is important to appreciate the historical context of conflict dynamics to appropriately 
situate the roles and positions of key stakeholders. The subsequent discussion expands the 
argument further by examining the institutions and dynamics involved in cross-sectoral 
resource governance, first at the national, and second at local levels. 
 
3.1 National level cross-sectoral governance: The predominance of structural determinants  
Within the bounds of discussions on formal mining within forest reserves, state agencies 
demonstrate co-operation and coordination. But as the case of bauxite mining in Ghana 
outlined below demonstrates, the governance of the broader mining-forestry issues lack 
overarching frameworks to guide development which, in contrast to the ostensibly 
technocratic basis of decision making, leads to a politicisation of cross-sectoral governance. 
Although the cross-sectoral liaison group facilitates coordination between different 
government agencies interested in mining in forest reserves, there are still concerns about the 
effectiveness of cross-sectoral integration in the broader governance landscape. One non-
governmental organisation (NGO) officer, for example, voiced concerns about the 
effectiveness of the national planning committee during an interview: 
There are two different ministries, two different agencies, there’s always friction of 
conflicting policies, so there’s no overarching institution that is seeking to bring some 
synergy, or coordination... Probably you could say it’s the national development 
planning commission, but they (don’t) have the resources or the technical capacity to 
do such a distinction. It’s mostly always political; the decision making process is 
almost always political. 
A regional forestry manager raised similar concerns when reflecting on the prospect of 
bauxite mining in the Atewa Forest8 Reserve.  The manager explained that ‘it would be better 
if there were some national policy guidelines, but there are no standard guidelines, so that one 
is above us, it will go to cabinet’. 
                                                          
8 Which has been designated an area of Globally Significant Biodiversity (GSB). 
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The contention that cross-sectoral policymaking is politically-driven warrants further scrutiny 
because, as will be argued, it contrasts with the predominantly technocratic mode of 
governance widely espoused by government officials and donors. Despite raising cross-
sectoral issues as a concern, very little guidance is given through the Natural Resources and 
Environmental Governance (NREG) program on the governance of arising conflicts and that 
which is given is rooted in cost-benefit analysis (CBA). As the first program document under 
NREG states (World Bank, 2008:36), ‘An independent, participatory cost-benefit analysis of 
the mining sector in all of its aspects (e.g., land degradation, environmental and social 
impacts) will be undertaken to determine whether, on balance, mining is beneficial to Ghana 
as a way to address public concern over this issue’. Although CBA is the primary tool for 
national cross-sectoral governance, it does not accurately describe the processes which 
actually govern national level cross-sectoral decision making. Rather, the focus on CBA is 
symptomatic of a policy discourse which is framed by the hegemonic neoliberal discourse, 
particularly the market-led paradigm of contemporary environmental governance 
(Humphreys, 2009). The case of the proposed mining of bauxite in the Atewa Forest Reserve 
is illustrative of this.   
An integrated aluminium industry was a part of Kwame Nkrumah’s early post-independent 
socialist vision for industrialisation (Tsikata, 1997). Even though the principal aspects of an 
integrated industry were developed, this has never fully been realised. The smelter built at 
Tema Harbour has consistently struggled to operate due to fluctuations in power prices and 
availability from the hydroelectric dam at the Volta; it invariably operates below 20 per cent 
capacity (Coakely, 2003). The smelter was originally majority owned by the Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) of the United States, but in 2003 Kaiser signed 
a memorandum of understanding to transfer its whole stake, liability and obligations to the 
state.9 The Ghana Bauxite Company, owned by the Chinese firm, Bosai Minerals, manages 
the country’s only operational bauxite mine at Awaso. Productivity at the mine has been, and 
continues to be, constrained by lack of capacity of the railway to transport ore to the coast for 
shipping (Coakely, 2003). 
One official from the Minerals Commission explained in an interview that despite the 
difficulties Ghana has had developing its bauxite industry, its association with Nkrumah’s 
political vision and potential economic benefits means that: ‘...successive governments in this 
                                                          
9 After which it was shut until 2011 (VALCO, 2013). 
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country have been trumpeting that they want the country go into an integrated Bauxite-
Aluminium industry’.  That objective was given a boost in 2010 when Bosai Minerals signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the government, agreeing to invest US$1.2 billion in 
developing the industry and a modern alumina refinery.  Furthermore, the government has 
granted licences to carrying out prospecting within the Atewa Forest Reserve, an exception to 
a policy which prohibits mining in forest reserves. As one government official explained in 
an interview: 
Quite recently [2011] Vimetco Bauxite Company was granted a prospecting licence to 
carry out exploration in a forest area. There are about two areas, but the prospecting 
licence are many, there are about five or so. The decision was made to allow Vimetco 
to go and carry out exploration because, since early 1920 or so, exploration was 
carried out.10 
Although there is little transparency regarding this decision, the company was keen to 
maintain the impression of technocratic policy making based on cost-benefit analysis. When 
a project manager was asked in an interview whether the company’s executive was confident 
of being allowed to progress to the exploitation stage, he explained that:  
It is a political decision, the politicians have to decide – they can either mine the area, 
and it will provide so many jobs, or they can leave it as a forest, and nothing will 
come of it... there should be a cost-benefit analysis, and that will inform the political 
decision [emphasis added]. 
The decision regarding mining in Atewa will reputedly be made on a rational economic basis. 
However, this narrative epitomises how structural determinants of power and governance 
influence national and international decision making. In this case, decision making is being 
driven by historical precedent on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the hegemonic 
neoliberal discourse. These factors combined frame governance within a market based 
paradigm and pre-empt the factors of relevance in decision making which supersede 
alternative stances on cross-sectoral issues, particularly non-market environmental factors.  
Although there are several conservation NGOs attempting to change policymakers’ frame of 
reference, they cannot compete with the power that multinational companies have over public 
                                                          
10 Bauxite was first observed in the Atewa Range by Sir Albert Kitson in 1914 and was first prospected 
by the British Aluminium Company in 1957 (Kesse, 1974).     
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discourse. Mining companies, as evidenced by their continued expansion in Ghana and 
elsewhere, have aligned themselves with global hegemonic discourses and are dominating 
discursive debates on cross-sectoral natural resource governance. But as the widespread 
presence of resource conflicts (e.g. Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007; Murguía and Böhling, 2013) 
demonstrates, companies have found it increasingly difficult to translate that success into 
operations which do not exacerbate local disputes over resources. 
Mining companies become embroiled in local-level conflicts which are not so easily 
understood or controlled discursively. Effectively, cross-sectoral governance dynamics in the 
mining industry are transformed from structural discourses over trade-offs at the national 
level to conflicts over resource-use at the local level characterised by a wide variety of 
stakeholders demonstrating appreciable agency. In an attempt to alleviate the negative 
consequences of localised conflicts, companies and state institutions have adopted a 
technocratic rhetoric around participatory deliberative governance, and have employed 
consultants to try and accommodate local concerns within the vagaries of neoliberal discourse 
and transnational capital. An official from the Minerals Commission explained in an 
interview how additional royalties levied on companies mining in forested areas facilitated 
the employment of a consultant to integrate community concerns: 
...a consultant goes there independently to carry out a needs assessment, and then the 
consultant will spell out what has to be done for the various communities based on the 
information gathered from the field... this is being done to ensure there is equity and 
fairness.  
The use of consultants, or ‘development experts’, to govern conflicts arising from cross-
sectoral interactions is one component within a broad matrix of stakeholders which has 
appreciable agency over governance at the local level. The following section reviews this 
matrix, arguing that it interacts sporadically with a series of disconnected government 
agencies which, unintentionally, support the proliferation of informality and corruption.  
 
3.2 Local cross-sectoral governance: Untangling stakeholder agency 
As previously detailed, local government agencies responsible for managing the intersection 
of mining and forestry are characterised by institutional fragmentation. The clear and 
concrete delineation of responsibility between agencies combined with a lack of collaboration 
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at the local level inhibits the successful monitoring and enforcement of laws governing forest 
conservation and mining, especially in the small-scale sector. The resultant high levels of 
informality render cross-sectoral governance arrangements a complex matrix composed of a 
variety of stakeholders, notably traditional authorities, land owners and financiers. Although 
structural components are also relevant to developing an understanding of local governance, 
this section of the paper argues that stakeholders demonstrate relatively more agency over 
decisions regarding ASM in forested areas than those governing at a national level who are 
confined within neoliberal discourses and policy path dependencies.  
Traditional authorities are central to the governance of ASM in forested areas, and wider 
resource management dynamics, because they are the customary land holders (Nyame and 
Blocher, 2010). Much of their involvement can be traced to dissatisfaction regarding the 
distribution of benefits accruing from resource use, especially minerals which are vested in 
the state. While they receive mineral royalties from operations in the large-scale sector, chiefs 
receive minimal direct benefits from gold mined in the formal ASM sector. Similarly, 
although traditional authorities relinquished primary responsibility for much of Ghana’s 
forest stock through the colonial imposition of forest reserves, residual discontent combined 
with a lack of tangible benefits accruing to them from forest reserves means that in some 
areas, they want to renegotiate the terms of forest reserves, or simply, do not support state 
efforts to protect them. One forest reserve manager indicated that some chiefs in his 
jurisdiction wanted to renegotiate the boundary of the reserve because more benefits might be 
realised for the community.  
Although this is not a forest management strategy under serious consideration, it is often a de 
facto occurrence as, according to some chiefs, local forest managers agree informally to 
allow access to reserves for farming and mining. None of the reserve managers interviewed 
explicitly indicated that they had entered into such informal agreements, but some did 
highlight how the relatively large sums of money involved in illegal ASM, the personal risk 
to their safety11 and the perceived futility of arresting miners12 combined to incentivise 
corrupt practices. The agency of chiefs and forest reserve managers, however, is evidenced 
by the spatially heterogeneous distribution of ASM among forest reserves; where chiefs and 
                                                          
11 Several forest guards have been killed by small-scale mine operators in recent years (Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2013).  
12 Because 200 cedi (~100 USD) court fines are an inadequate deterrent.  
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reserve managers present a united position against small scale miners in forest reserves, such 
as in Atewa, ASM activities are restricted.  
The contention over the benefits related to resource-use and subsequent precipitation of 
informal agreements between chiefs and local state managers is exacerbated by a lack of 
knowledge among some chiefs regarding the mining industry and associated laws. One 
Minerals Commission officer explained in an interview how, in light of widespread 
misconceptions about the process for gaining concessions, education is the key to resolving 
disputes: 
‘Some chiefs came here, saying we won’t agree, we won’t agree. I sat them down 
here, and then I educated them... they went to Accra and my boss said, he has told you 
the true facts... and now the case is resolved. They’ve gone back to what I told them 
to do, and they are now happy. They’ve even gone to bring the applications, for me to 
process for them.’ 
This illustrates how the collaborative behaviour of key stakeholders exercising their agency 
can lead to improved governance outcomes. There are, of course, structural issues which limit 
the capacity of such relationships developing. The lack of geological data, for example, is 
compounded by discrepancies between maps held at the Minerals Commission and Forestry 
Commission. Examining the power dynamics between key stakeholders sheds further light on 
both the inadequacy of sectoral and technocratic approaches to resource governance and the 
deeply political nature of the context within which mining-forest debates are embedded.  
 
4. Critical reflections on stakeholder power, authority and legitimacy 
The dual concerns of environmental protection, particularly climate change, and economic 
well-being are at the heart of endeavours to understand the governance of natural resources. 
The process and outcomes of decision making around mining and forests, particularly where 
they overlap spatially, are dependent on the power, legitimacy and authority of key 
stakeholders. The analysis that follows reviews the power relations between the three 
principal stakeholder groups associated with the governance of the mining-forest nexus: 
mining companies, traditional authorities and the state. The discussion highlights how 
variable and perspective dependent legitimacy can be among stakeholders. Traditional 
authorities, for example, have considerable popular legitimacy in the ASM sector which is 
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not reflected in the large-scale sector. It is argued that the postcolonial state has failed to 
accommodate these dynamics which, combined with subservience to donor interests, has led 
to an erosion of its authority over resource management. 
 
 
4.1 ‘Can you battle Gold Fields?’: Power and legitimacy in the mining sector 
Several of the mining companies operating in Ghana’s forest reserves are large multinational 
entities whose power is rooted in their considerable economic capital. Companies have 
leveraged this power to establish and maintain control over Ghana’s premium ore deposits, 
including those in forest reserves. The lack of transparency regarding decisions to allow 
mining companies to operate in forest reserves gives rise to concerns that mining companies 
have also used their economic power to lubricate their entry into reserves through corrupt 
means. 
Suspicions of high-level bribery and corruption in the mining industry are notoriously 
difficult to substantiate, but mining companies also use their economic power to control and 
influence public discourse and subvert dissenting voices. Mining companies have perpetuated 
the development discourse, which posits minerals as the foundation of economic growth, and 
outline the threat that undermining their operations equates to lessening the economic 
benefits associated with mining. In Ghana, one mining company was lauded for holding 
journalist training (Daily guide, 2011). While a proactive and critical media can usefully hold 
multinational companies to account, the objectivity of journalists trained by mining 
companies is questionable and this dominance potentially subverts opportunities for a well 
informed and balanced public discussion.  
An NGO officer explained further in an interview how mining companies’ economic wealth 
translated into power over public discussion. The officer argued that a lack of environmental 
lawyers in the country, coupled with a judiciary with a poor ecological understanding, 
undermined attempts to tackle mining companies through the law courts. Although:  
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...some lawyers in Accra are working [on environmental issues] on a no win, no fee 
basis... NGOs don’t have the expertise or capacity to support communities who know 
they are being wronged... how can you battle Gold Fields?13  
In the ASM sector, money is also a key component of power dynamics, but it manifests 
differently. Unlike the large-scale sector, there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity 
regarding the economic power of actors in the small-scale sectors. In general, it is the 
sponsors, gold buyers and land owners, in partnership with the chiefs, who are profiting from 
the sector and accordingly have power over where and when ASM occurs. One land owner 
and sponsor in the Eastern Region touched on this power during an interview:  
We don’t allow them [the miners] to enter the forest reserve, those people in the 
reserve are hunters... and the chief is campaigning for the environment. So, he won’t 
allow people to go into the reserve. 
Other participants in the sector have considerably less influence over where mining occurs. 
For some of these actors, it is the promise of wealth that incentivises their entry into the 
sector. In reality, many poverty-driven entrants into ASM stay poor and remain trapped in the 
sector (Hilson, 2012). They are effectively subject to their sponsors and have little control 
over their activities. One miner typified his position during an interview when he said, ‘we’re 
just the workers... we are working to chop [eat].’    
The public political discussion on ASM in Ghana, however, fails to address the heterogeneity 
within the sector, even though it is well known. One sponsor explained how his application 
for a concession was rejected on the basis that someone else who was ‘higher up in the party’ 
got precedence. The involvement of public officials in the sector suggests that some powerful 
members of Ghanaian society may be framing small-scale miners as scapegoats to deflect 
attention away from the actors who are actually responsible for the proliferation of mining 
activities.  
The influx of Chinese migrants who are willing to sponsor activities further complicates the 
political dynamics (Hilson et al., 2014). On one hand, they are welcomed as a source of 
investment and operate within the matrix of sponsors, land owners and chiefs, but on the 
other they are grouped together with small-scale miners and presented as an uncontrollable 
threat. The latter position reflects the treatment of some miners as scapegoats, because, while 
                                                          
13 Goldfields is a large-scale gold mining company operating the Western Region. 
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some Chinese may be working independently, in most instances their operations would not be 
viable without the acquiescence of the local chiefs and security forces. The presence of 
conflicts around mining areas, in both the large- and small-scale mining sectors, betrays a 
lack of local legitimacy among key stakeholders. In the mining sector, chiefs are influential 
stakeholders and understanding the landscape of their authority is an essential component of 
understanding cross-sectoral governance and resource-use conflicts in Ghana.  
 
4.2 Lumpy legitimacy: How powerful are traditional authorities in natural resource 
governance? 
The British colonial policy of indirect rule both increased the power chiefs had over resources 
and simultaneously undermined their sovereignty and accountability by placing their 
authority under that of the governor (Addo-Fening, 2008). In contemporary resource 
governance, chiefs remain a primary stakeholder. In the large-scale mining sector, it is 
predominantly paramount chiefs who hold power over development outcomes through the 
receipt of royalties and who are considered legitimate representatives of communities by 
mining companies. But this power is often unrealised, leading to division in communities and 
a lack of local legitimacy. In the ASM sector, chiefs across the hierarchical structure have 
considerable authority but sometimes operate in direct conflict with state and with little 
accountability. The consequential ‘lumpy’ legitimacy of chieftaincy characterises much of 
the complexity typical of contemporary debates regarding the role of the state and traditional 
authorities in resource governance.  
The granting of large-scale mining concessions is contingent on the approval of both local 
and paramount chiefs. But in practice, the constitutional vesting of minerals in the state 
renders traditional authorities’ role in decision making passive and increasingly ceremonial. 
Chiefs do, however, have considerable power over the development outcomes of mining 
activities through the receipt of royalties. This power is largely latent though as 
disagreements between stools regarding land ownership often delay the distribution of 
royalties. This is currently the case around Obuasi, where seven stools under the Adansi 
Kingdom are amicably trying to resolve a dispute over land.14 
                                                          
14 Information from an interview with a Chief (16.05.12) 
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The power of chiefs over development outcomes in large-scale mining communities can also 
be considered as mostly unrealised because benefits are rarely widely distributed, which can 
lead to poor relationships within mining communities. The case of Dokyiwa in Obuasi 
Municipality is illustrative. In this case, the village chief (odikro) was given money and a job 
as part of the settlement package for the re-location of the village even though, as villagers 
complained repeatedly during an interview, ‘he is illiterate’. From the perspective of the 
mining companies, chiefs are legitimate representatives of communities and conduits for 
benefit sharing. The lack of benefit sharing within mining communities, however, means that 
despite their formal authority over land they lack local legitimacy. The lack of popular 
acceptance of their authority exacerbates conflicts as aggrieved communities pursue their 
livelihoods by, for example, accessing non-timber forest products (NTFPs) or ASM areas on 
mineral concessions without regard for formal agreements between mines and chiefs. 
Substantive opposition to chiefs, however, is rarely manifested due to a lack of accountability 
mechanisms15 and their deeply-rooted cultural authority (Yankah, 2008). As one district 
assembly member in a mining area explained in an interview: ‘In these communities, if you 
want to get up and make a noise, or try and hold people accountable, your own parents will 
tell you to sit down’. 
With regard to the large-scale mining sector, chiefs at all levels, have legitimacy from the 
perspective of mining companies and formal state mechanisms, but have less legitimacy 
among their communities. In the ASM sector, the character of chiefs’ legitimacy is 
effectively reversed. Among communities they have higher levels of legitimacy supported, in 
most cases, by their role in developing the activity. One miner explained in an interview how 
popular the chief was because he negotiated an agreement with the Forestry Commission 
over an area where they could mine undisturbed and had also organised the collecting of 
rubbish in the village.  
The illegality of the majority of ASM activities, however, undermines their broader 
legitimacy from the perspective of the state. The view of one Forestry Commission officer, 
articulated during an interview, reveals both how important the chiefs are in the sector, and 
how their role is negatively perceived by state agencies:  
                                                          
15 The Asafo (a group of men from the wider population who come together to ‘restrain the chief from 
acting in complete disregard to the popular will’) used to represent an accountability mechanism for 
chiefs, but this tradition appears to have disintegrated over the last century (Addo-Fening, 2008:37). 
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By tradition, mining, or any other activity on the chiefs land, cannot happen without 
the chiefs consent. However, it happens sometimes that some of the chiefs are 
conniving or colluding with the illegal miners. In the formal ASM sector the benefits 
get shared out, so some chiefs prefer to work without a permit in order to take all the 
royalties, and not divide them.  
The view of a district planning officer, divulged during an interview, further supports the 
contention that state officials perceive chiefs to be powerful actors in the ASM sector. 
Discussing the scope for communities to control ASM in their area, he said: 
People might agitate, but to what effect, what power do they have? Some have 
succeeded with the help and power of chiefs, but without the chief, they don’t have 
any power. 
Although this characterisation of chiefly power in the ASM sector captures the majority of 
contexts, some chiefs promote a different discourse. Some chiefs argued that they lack any 
power over miners, even in some cases on their own farms. This not only highlights the 
heterogeneity of the sectors dynamics, but also alludes to how actors are using the ASM 
sector to position themselves within broader development and governance debates.  
Denney (2013) moots the question of whether donors should consider chiefs, whose 
governance mode contrasts with the participatory democracy ideology of the donors, as 
legitimate partners and notes the considerable challenge with co-opting them into 
predominantly state-led interventions. These debates do not question the cultural and 
historical authority of traditional authorities.  In fact, as Ubink and Quan (2008) suggest, the 
state policy of non-interference with ‘chieftaincy issues’16 is so pervasive that it prevents an 
accurate and open articulation of land-based issues in Ghana. By aligning themselves with 
national discourses on the uncontrollable nature of ASM and the necessity for environmental 
protection,17 some chiefs can be seen as pursuing a legitimising strategy and attempting to 
position themselves for an increasingly influential role in Ghana’s resource management.  
This contention requires that some consideration is given to the potential involvement of 
chiefs in emerging forestry projects such as REDD+ and development strategies more 
                                                          
16 The term ‘chieftaincy issues’ is widely used to refer to issues regarding land ownership and chiefly 
jurisdiction.  
17 For example, the Okyenhene established an environmental task force in the Kibi area and has also 
founded the Okyeman Environment Foundation, which has received funding from the World Bank’s 
Global Environment Facility (Roosbroeck, 2006)  
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generally. Their involvement in projects is likely to be imperative if projects are to garner the 
popular support and access to land required. Moreover, their role in the distribution of 
benefits requires explicit attention. If carbon projects reflect institutional arrangements in the 
mining sector, then chiefs would benefit directly through the payment of royalties. If these 
funds are used appropriately then projects could benefit from the popular legitimacy chiefs 
enjoy in some areas. Conversely, if, as is sometimes the case in large-scale mining 
communities, royalties are not used for the wider benefit of communities then REDD+ 
projects could face serious difficulties in ensuring equity within projects and also wider 
legitimacy, which in turn could lead to the disruption of arrangements to conserve or enhance 
forest stocks. There are not easy technical solutions to these problems; they are political 
issues. For example, if projects agree, as some large-scale mines have, to pay some 
proportion of the financial benefits as royalties to chiefs and distribute other funds directly to 
other members of communities, then that arrangement implicitly legitimises the view that 
royalties are distributed to traditional authorities rather than through traditional authorities.  
Traditional authorities are evidently central to power dynamics in Ghana’s natural resource 
sectors, but their power and legitimacy varies greatly depending on the sector and their 
corollary relationship with companies, communities and state agencies. The hierarchical 
structure of traditional authorities, including paramount chiefs (omanhene), divisional chiefs 
(ohene), and village chiefs (odikro), also shapes their influence role in resource governance. 
Investigating in greater detail the role of traditional authorities across the hierarchy in mineral 
and forest governance would provide more nuanced understandings of governance dynamics 
and should be considered essential knowledge to incorporate into development interventions 
targeted at mining or forestry sectors. But in general, chiefly power in the large-scale sector is 
largely latent. And, in the ASM sector, a minority of chiefs appear to be positioning 
themselves to seek greater recognition in state centric resource management regimes.  
 
4.3 Authority without legitimacy: Undermined state power in natural resources sectors 
In Ghana, the state has considerable authority to influence natural resource management and 
interventions in the sector tend to be exclusively state centric. This section argues, however, 
that state power is limited by the implementation of policies which do not account for the 
importance of ‘informal’ activities such as ASM and chainsawing in communities’ 
livelihoods. This both undermines the legitimacy of state policies, but also induces conflicts 
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between state agencies and security forces on the one hand, and resource users on the other, 
which further inhibit the influence of local government agents.  
Since the 1992 constitution was ratified by more than 90 per cent of the population in a 
referendum, Ghana has enjoyed a period of relative stability characterised by strengthening 
democracy and generally high levels of legitimacy (Gilley, 2012).18 While there is popular 
acceptance of the state and democracy at a national level, conflicts over resources at a local 
level suggest that its constitutional authority to legislate over natural resources lacks 
legitimacy. The lack of popular acceptance, at a local level, of resource-use laws results from 
policymakers neglecting to consider both the dynamics of sectors and the importance of 
activities, such as ASM or chainsawing, in the lives of those who engage in the activities.  
In the case of ASM, formalisation has failed to account for the characteristics of most 
participants (Teschner, 2012); even miners who would like to gain the security of a formal 
small-scale licence complain that it is prohibitively expensive and time consuming. 
Furthermore, the lack of geological data in the country means there is no guarantee that there 
will be any gold in the concession. One miner summarised the issue succinctly in an 
interview: ‘it is either a waste of time, or money, or both’. The 1998 blanket ban on chainsaw 
lumber led to even greater levels of ‘informality’ in the chainsaw sector than in the ASM 
sector where only 10 per cent of activities operate legally.  
The widespread criminalisation of important livelihood activities has been met with local 
resistance, manifest simply in the continued pursuit of activities. This is symptomatic of the 
lack of legitimacy among state actors charged with managing natural resources. It has also 
led to a very narrow one-dimensional approach to the conflicts. Where state agencies have 
attempted to enforce resource management laws, they have engaged in largely futile and 
protracted conflicts channelled through the military and police forces. These interventions are 
often ineffective or temporary as it is logistically and financially challenging to maintain a 
widespread 24-hour security presence over large areas.  
In response to the logistical challenges associated with coordinating security forces, the 
Forestry Commission has instituted an armed rapid response unit to help guard forest 
reserves. However, it is not only the lack of capacity to enforce laws through force which 
                                                          
18 This is supported by the 2012 Afrobarometer survey which found that 82 per cent of Ghanaians prefer 
democracy over non-democratic governance and 74 per cent of Ghanaians are fairly or very satisfied 
with the way democracy works in Ghana (Afrobarometer, 2012). 
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limits state power over resources. In ASM, for example, once operators reach court, there is 
insufficient scope within the law for judges to account for the heterogeneity of miners. 
Forestry Commission officials interviewed complained that relatively small (200 cedis)19 
fines in the courts represent an ineffective deterrent to sponsors and financiers.  
The inconsequential nature of punishments meted out by the judiciary towards ASM serves to 
demotivate officials and incentivise corruption. There is no incentive for forestry officials to 
risk arresting miners in forest reserves when they will return after a short period. 
Furthermore, the political climate around natural resources in Ghana, particularly ASM, 
means that government officials are reluctant to visit illegal sites to engage miners with 
advice on the formalisation process or where to mine20 because they will be labelled as 
corrupt. Furthermore, because of the militarised nature of conflicts they avoid illegal sites 
because they ‘don’t know what weapons they might have.’21  
These dynamics restrict local and district level state actors to the formal channels. And hence 
limit their influence over the majority of resource use contexts. At the national level, power 
over natural resource governance is threatened by broader trends regarding diminishing 
national sovereignty (Whitfield, 2009; Abdulai and Crawford, 2010; Brown, 2013). An 
illustrative example of this was highlighted by an EPA official, when he mused on the 
adoption of the REDD+ programme in the country at the behest of donors after a decision 
had been taken to shift away from program based support to general budgetary support. This 
shift was typified by the development of the NREG program, which was implemented in 
response to criticisms that donor assistance in the natural resource sector was poorly 
coordinated. The near-total omission of chiefs from the NREG policy program demonstrates 
how, through a reluctance to engage substantively with the influence of traditional authorities 
in resource governance, donors have eroded the ability of the state to approach, and 
potentially resolve these issues.  
Well-articulated concerns regarding the sovereignty of the state in postcolonial Ghana are 
being augmented by the introduction of Chinese development assistance (Tull, 2006; Mohan 
and Power, 2008). The recently agreed US$3bn development assistance from the China 
                                                          
19 About 60 US dollars.  
20 The lack of geological information is exacerbated by a lack of knowledge among miners who are 
criticised for speculative mining in unsuitable areas further worsening environmental degradation. One 
officer from the Minerals Commission says he can advise miners on the basis of his geological 
knowledge and they will consider him the ‘best magician’.  
21 Interview with forestry official (01.06.12) 
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Development Bank has been linked with the influx of Chinese operators in the ASM sector 
and the relative impunity with which they appear to operate. The anecdotal rise in conflicts 
involving Chinese operators appears to lend credence to these concerns (Nossiter and Feng, 
2013), but substantiating these concerns is extremely challenging.  
In summary, while the state has considerable authority to manage natural resources, this is 
undermined in two principal ways. First, by a lack of legitimacy at a local level rooted in 
poorly formulated policies which marginalise resource users who are heavily dependent on 
natural resource for their livelihoods; and second, by the erosion of sovereignty over 
resources engendered by the influence of foreign donors over policy.  
  
5. Concluding remarks 
Against mounting concern regarding the deleterious environmental and social impacts of 
poorly managed mining economies in sub-Saharan Africa, this paper has explored the 
governance of mining and forest activities in Ghana’s high forest zone. By examining 
interaction between sectors across scales, it was demonstrated that at a national level, 
relatively co-operative relations between agencies give the impression that resolving conflicts 
and divergent sectoral priorities is a technical matter of negotiating trade-offs. But locally, 
resource managers are faced with more tangible conflicts which are exacerbated by poor 
sectoral coordination, but are potentially more amenable to individuals and groups exercising 
their agency.  
These dynamics are reflected in involvement of mining companies who use their economic 
power to orientate national discourse around the costs and benefits of activities and 
associated impacts on economic growth, as well as find themselves embroiled in local 
conflicts which unmask the political dimensions of natural resource conflicts. The complexity 
of governance arrangements is typified by the contestations over, and vagaries of, the 
legitimacy and authority of traditional authorities in mine and forest activities. In the large-
scale mining sector, although the role of chiefs is generally passive, their power to influence 
development outcomes through the distribution of royalties is largely latent, undermining 
their legitimacy in communities. In the ASM sector, however, it is their legitimacy in the eyes 
of the state which is diminished due to their role in perpetuating the activity which is widely 
considered to be environmentally and socially damaging despite providing livelihoods for 
more than a million individuals.  
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The ‘lumpy’ legitimacy of traditional leaders is reflected in the authority of the state which, 
this paper has argued, has been eroded by diminishing local legitimacy as swathes of the 
country’s citizens have failed to realise sufficient benefits from the exploitation of mineral 
and forest resources. The state centric nature of emerging natural resource management 
initiatives means this contention is of critical importance. Although countries across sub-
Saharan Africa vary greatly in their specific governance arrangements, the case of Ghana 
illustrates that, in general, if policies and projects continue to neglect the reality of power 
dynamics between key stakeholders and resource governance continues to be understood 
primarily as a technocratic cost-benefit exercise, the prospects for donor-led interventions in 
the natural resources sector remain bleak.   
The mining-forestry issues outlined in this paper are embedded in much broader debates 
regarding the role of the state, traditional authorities and civil society and the market. As it is 
impossible to take a politically-neutral position on these issues, this paper advocates for more 
space to be created for these sensitive but vital questions to be deliberated among politicians, 
policymakers, academics and civil society more generally. Development donors could do 
considerably more to assist this process, most notably by having in place a more coherent and 
comprehensive strategy for integrating traditional authorities into their projects and perhaps 
by creating a forum for discussions to take place. Ultimately, however, this should be 
addressed by Ghanaians because as several decades of experience of ideologically-driven 
interventions suggest, externally imposed ideas of ‘good governance’ are unlikely to deliver 
the outcomes they aim for, however well-intentioned they may be. 
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